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ABSTRACT 
RUM (Reasoning with Uncertainty Module), is an integrated software tool based on a KEE, a frame 
system implemented in an object oriented language. RUM's architecture is composed of three layers: 
representation, inference, and control. 
The representation layer is based on frame-like data structures that capture the uncertainty information 
used in the inference layer and the uncertainty meta-information used in the control layer. The infer­
ence layer provides a selection of five T -norm based uncertainty calculi with which to perform the 
intersection, detachment, union, and pooling of information. The control layer uses the meta­
information to select the appropriate calculus for each context and to resolve eventual ignorance or 
conflict in the information. This layer also provides a context mechanism that allows the system to 
focus on the relevant portion of the knowledge base, and an uncertain-belief revision system that incre­
mentally updates the certainty values of well-formed formulae (w.ffs) in an acyclic directed deduction 
graph. 
RUM has been tested and validated in a sequence of experiments in both naval and aerial situation 
assessment (SA), consisting of correlating reports and tracks, locating and classifying platforms, and 
identifying intents and threats. An example of naval situation assessment is illustrated. The testbed 
environment for developing these experiments has been provided by LOIT A, a symbolic simulator 
implemented in Zetalisp Flavors. This simulator maintains time-varying situations in a multi-player 
antagonistic game where players must make decisions in light of uncertain and incomplete data. RUM 
has been used to assist one of the LOIT A players to perform the SA task. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The trend followed by most approaches for reasoning with uncertainty has shown an almost complete 
disregard for the fundamental issues of automated reasoning, such as the proper representation of 
information and meta-information, the allowable inference paradigms suitable for the representation, 
and the efficient control of such inferences in an explicitly programmable form. The majority of the 
approaches to reasoning with uncertainty do not properly cover these issues. Some approaches lack 
expressiveness in their representation paradigm. Other approaches require unrealistic assumptions to 
provide uniform combining rules defining the plausible inferences. Most approaches do not even 
recognize the need for having an explicit control of the inferences. 
This lack of awareness has been the driving force for compiling a list of requirements (desiderata) that 
each reasoning system handling uncertain information should satisfy. Following the typical structure of 
automated reasoning techniques, the list of requirements has been organized in three layers: represen­
tation, inference, and control. The extension of this explicit layered separation from crisp-reasoning 
systems to uncertain-reasoning systems is a natural step leading to a better integration of the manage­
ment of uncertainty with the various techniques for automated reasoning. 
* This work was partially supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under USAF/Rome Air Development 
Center contract F30602-85-C-0033. Views and conclusions contained in this paper are those of the authors and should not be interpreted 
as representing the official opinion or policy of DARPA or the U.S. Government 
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An in-depth treatment of the layered desiderata can be found in a previous paper [5]. In this article we I describe RUM (Reasoning with Uncertainty Module), which represents our answer to the desiderata We also illustrate a naval situation assessment problem which is used to validate RUM. This applica-
tion is based on an architecture designed to · simulate various military scenarios involving Multi­
Sensors/Multi-Targets (MS/MT) and to perfonn situation assessment (SA) related tasks. The MS/MT I architecture, illustrated in Figure 1, is composed of two major blocks: a reasoning system and a simu-
lation environment. 
REASONING 
��=�==����i§������:=��st� SYSTEM . 
Figure 1: Architecture for Multi-Sensors/Multi-Targets (MS/MT) 
RUM is the reasoning system used in this architecture. This system, built according to the three layer 
desiderata, is thoroughly described in [3]. It is summarized in section 2, with a particular focus on its 
control layer. The second block of the MS/MT architecture, the simulation environment, is described 
in section 3, in conjunction with some definitions of the tasks required to perfonn situation assessment. 
The last two sections contain an analysis of the MS/MT experiment and some preliminary conclusions 
on this work. 
2. RUM, THE REASONING SYSTEM 
RUM is an integrated software tool based on KEET.M., a frame system implemented in an object 
oriented language. The underlying theory of RUM, centered around the concept of Triangular nonns, 
was described in two previous articles [2,5]. RUM's architecture is composed of three layers: represen­
tation, inference, and control. A philosophical motivation for RUM's three layer organization can be 
found in [3]. This section summarizes some of the theoretical results and provides a unified frame­
work for their interpretation and use in RUM's architecture. 
2.1 Representation: the Wff System and the Rule Language 
The representation layer is based on frame-like data structures that capture the uncertainty infonnation 
used in the inference layer and the uncertainty meta-infonnation used in the control layer. 
2.1.1 RUM's Wff System 
RUM's Wff System modifies KEE's representation of a w.ff (well-fonned fonnula). RUM's wff is the 
pair [<unit> <Slot>], which is the description of a variable in the problem domain. For each wff a 
corresponding uncertainty unit is created. The unit contains a list of the values that were considered 
for the wff. For each value the unit maintains its certainty's lower and upper bounds, an ignorance 
measure, a consistency measure, and the evidence source. 
Figure 2 illustrates an example of an uncertainty unit attached to a wff. The wff is the variable 
[Platform-439 Classs-name]. In the uncertainty unit, under the slot VALVES, we can see the possible 
values which were considered by the system and their corresponding certainty bounds. The uncertainty 
unit also maintains a record of the rule instances which were fired to derive such values (for inferred 
wjfs, this logical support represents the evidence source). 
RUM's Wff System allows the user to express arbitrary uncertainty granularity by providing the flexi­
bility to mix precise and imprecise measures of certainty in defining the input certainty (points, inter­
vals, fuzzy numbers/intervals, linguistic values) and the rule strengths (categorical and plausible 
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IF/IFF). Various term sets of linguistic probabilities with fuzzy-valued semantics [2] provide a selec­
tion of input granularity. The values of the terms can be used as default values or can be modified by 
the user. 
Own slot: COHSTAAI'IITS.RULES troJR Pl.ATFOIIM•439..ct..ASS.NAME 
JRMrita�tet: OVERRIOE.VALUES 
VG/vcs: f�.BOAT .POS.IO-ot:.•300·TRACK·3 in MSMT, 
f!StW'IO.BOit.T .POS.IO-DK·300•TRACK•O 1n MSMT 
Own slot: Ot:PENO(NT .RI.A..ES fl'Om PLATFORM•439oQ.ASS.NAIIR: 
/lt/Mr{tQw;e: OVERAIOE:.VALU£5 
ValwC/ass: QEN(JW;:.Al,LE.UMT m HARDWARE 
COM-Jtt:anotherhstorrules. 
Va/H.I: MERCHANT.TYPf.t.JNit.•1000..flt.ATFDfiM·439 m MSMT, 
FISHWG.TVP£.t.INK·1010�ATFORM•43a In MSMT 
Own slot: DS.RULES from PLATFOAM-439..ct.. US.NAMIE 
lnhuita��Cc: OVEAAIO£.VALUEI 
Va/HCIGII' OfN(AIC.RIJLE.UNIT In HAADWAIIIE 
A�n��tiU: AV .8AD In HARDWARE 
COWftUII: Rules 10 be COJil.bined: wtn1 tha Oempster..SChael'er conorm.. 
Valocs: UNKNOWN 
Own slot: fLAG hom l't...ATFDAM-4311-cl.ASS.NAME 
lNMritaw;c: OVEAAOE.VALUES 
AIJllllits:AV.FLAQ m HARDWARE, AV.Al..ERT in HAAOWARE 
Car<ti1tll ity.Min: I 
Ca1tliMlity.Max: I 
C-..1: Good or X. 
Vai¥1U:GOOD 
OWn slot: NlCESSITV t'rom �TFDAM-439-Q.ASS.NAME 
lnhtrittt�t<ec: OVEAAilE.VAlUE:S 
A'IRIIiU; AV .POU.UT£ In HARDWARE 
Ctt�i�t��lity.Min:l 
ca,diMiity.Max: 1 
COIOIIMIIt: Minimum support tor e wrt. 
Va/uu:(0.6U8104G.8!6S68 6.Ll816H37 0.0784l9ll) 
Own slot: Pl.AUMII..ITY from Pt..Alf'OMI-439-ct..AJS.NAMf 
JnhcritaMc: OVEAAmf.VALUES 
Avt��titt: AV .POLLUTE ln HARDWARE 
CalVIinality.Min: I 
CartlirttZiity.Max: I 
COfftlrtUII: Man�aum support tor e wrt. 
Valou: I 
Own slot: 51 .RULES !'rom Pl.ATFOMI•4311-ct..ASS.NAMIE 
/Writnce: OVERAilf.VALUES 
Val..Cla�:r: OENEAIC.RUI..E.uNIT In ttAADWARE 
A-iU: AV .BAD In HAADWAAIE 
c�: Rulet thet Uti 1t1 be disjuncted uslne Sl. 
ValftJ': UNKNOWN 
Own slot: S15.RULES O'om PlATFOMI-4311-ct..ASS.NAIIE 
Jftlwritll�tt;t: OVfRAmE,VALUES .. _ .. . .... ..... ..... ... "'" .. '_" .. '- ... ... _ 
Own slol: SZ.RtA.fS from PLATFORM•439-ct..AM.NAMIE 
lrthcriMrtt:e: 0VEARIDIE.VALU£S 
ValiHCia:r�: OEN£AIC.Rlll.E.UNT In HAimWAAE 
AliVItit:r.· AV.BAO tn HAROWARE 
C�: Rules 1t1 be disJUne� uslne 52. 
VaiiiU: suti.POS.IO-cl.OSE.POP.UP•500•TAACK•3 In MSMT, 
..-:RCHANT .NEO.IO-MAMUVERS·210-Pl.ATF'OAM·439 In MSMT, 
MERCHANT .NEO.IO·DtSTANT .POP.liP•ZZO•TRACK•3 In MSMT, 
MEACHANT.NEQ.Il..otSTANT.POP.UP·Z20·TRACK·O In MSMT, 
SUB.POS.IO-ct..DSE.POP.lJP•!iOO•TRACK•O In MSMT, 
SUII.POUO•SONAR•6!iO•TAACIC.•3 In MSMT, 
SUB.POS.IJ•SONAR•6!iO•TAACK•O in MSMT 
Own Jlol: S26.AUlf:S f'rQnl Pl.ATf0AM•U9-a.AJS.N.UIE 
Jftlwritilrtee: OVERAIOE.VALUES 
Vai!ICCia:rJ: OENERIC.RULE.UNIT In HARDWARE 
A'Nitit:r:AV.BAD In HARDWAA£ 
COIIIIMnl: Rulell 1t1 be d1Jjune� u$1nc 52.5. 
Valuu: FISHWG.BOAT.NEO.IJ-uSE.AADAR·330·TAACK•O 1n MSMT, 
FISHW0.80ATMO.IJ•TDO.fAJT•3tO•TAACK•3 In MSMT, 
MERCHANT.POS.IO-oK-100-TRACK·O in MSMT, 
MERCHANT.POS.IO-oK•100•TRACK•31n MSMT, 
MEACHANT.NEQ.IJ•TOO-SlOW•t40•TAACK•3 in MSMT, 
MERCHANT.NEO.IJ·TDO-SlOW•140·TRACK•O in MSMT, 
MERCtUIIIEO.IO•TOO-SMALl•200•TRACK•3 In MSMT, 
MEACH.NEOJD•TDO.sMAl.L•ZOO•TRACK•O In MSMT, 
FISHWO.IOAT .NEQ.IO•TOO.fAST•310•TRACK•O In MSMT, 
FISHNJJIOAT .NEO.t0-uSE.RAOAA•330•TRitCK·3 in MSMT 
Own slOt: S3JilllES t'rolll Pl.ATFORM•439-cLASS.NAW: 
llllttritil�t«: OVEIIAIDIE.VA1U£S 
VaiiHCta�s: OENERtC.AU..E.LNT In HARDWARE 
Awll{tJ;AV.BAD In HARDWARE 
COIIIIINIIt: Rules to be disjl.meted. uslnc S3. 
VaiHS: FISHINO.IOAT .NEO.IJ·TOO.fAR•340•TRACK•O in MSMT, 
FISHW0.80AT .NEO.IO•TOO.FAR•340•TRACK•3 in MSMT, 
FISHWO.BOAT .NEO.ID•TQO.BKI•320•TRACK·3 In MSMT, 
MERCHANT.NEO.IJ-DOOOE.STATICJIE�-2!i0--f'l.ATfOflll•439 In MSMT, 
MEACHANT.NEQJ0-8AO.WEATttER•280-PLATf0RM•e39 In MSMT, 
FISHNJ.BOAT .NEO.tD•T00.810•320•TRACIC.•O In MSMT 
Own �lot: YALUf t'tom. PlATFDAIII-439-ct..A:SS.NAME 
JRlwriMrtcc: DVEIIRmE.VALUES 
c�:Velueot�tot. 
Va/IIU: (SUBMARlN!!: MERCHANT FISHING-BOAT), 
(( OGGO)(O.I9U9JU&.37 0.1U0.05)) 
n:·�9���4(:.::::::9�s·:�:::::$:.o:!�:::JJ!,• o�o:�!:t�l))) 
Figure 2: Uncertainty Unit Associated with wff [Platform-439 Class-name] 
2.1.2 RUM's Rule System: The Rule Language 
RUM's Rule System replaces KEE Rule System-3 capabilities by incorporating uncertainty information 
in the inference scheme. The uncertain information is described in the uncertainty units of the wjfs, 
represented in RUM's Wff System, and in the degrees of sufficiency and necessity attached to each 
rule*. The degree of sufficiency denotes the extent to which one should believe in the rule conclusion, 
if the rule premise is satisfied. The degree of necessity indicates the confidence with which one can 
negate the conclusion, if the premise fails. 
A rule is internally represented by a frame with several slots. These slots include the n�e of the rule; 
the lists of contexts, premises, and conclusions; the rule's sufficiency and necessity; and the T-norm to 
be used for aggregation. All slots (except the name, premises, and consequences) have default values. 
The contexts, premises, and conclusions can comprise values, variables, RUM predicates and arbitrary 
LISP functions. Rules with unbound variables are instantiated with the necessary environment to pro­
duce rule instances. An example of two RUM rules is provided in section 3.2. 
The T -norm specified with each rule is used to aggregate the certainties of the rule premises and to 
perform detachment (which computes the certainty of the conclusion given the sufficiency and neces­
sity of the rule). It defaults to T 3, which is the MIN function. The associated T-conorm is used to 
aggregate the certainties of identical conclusions inferred by multiple rule instances derived from the 
same rule. These are often subsumptive, and the value defaults to S3, the MAX function. Finally, each 
separate consequence of a rule has a specified T -conorm that will be used to aggregate the consequence 
with identical consequences derived from different rules. (i.e., multiple assignments of the same value 
to the wff). The negation operator causes the wff to be assigned the complemented value.** 
* It is important to note that the inference symbol -+ in the production rule A -+' B is interpreted as a (weak) m�.�teri41 implication operator 
in multiple-valued logics. The value s is the lower bound of the degree of sufficiency of the imJlication. This is in contrast with the interpretation of conditioning, i.e., s = P(BIA). The symbol f-+ in the production rule A f--+8 B is interpreted as a (weak) logical 
equivalence operator in multiple-valued logics, in which s and n are the lower botmds of sufficiency and necessity, respectively. This 
(weak) logical equivalence is an if-and-only-if (IFF) rule, which can be decomposed into the two rules: A -+' B and B _,.n A (equivalent 
to -.A _,.n -B). RUM's rules are of the type C -+ (A f--+8 ,n B), where C indicates the context of the rule (see section 2.3.3) and -+ 
represents the strong material implication. 
** If a wffhas a value A with an If the certainty intetval attached to a value A is [L(A), U(A)], its complemented value, -.A, has a certainty 
intetval defined by [1-U(A), 1-L(A)]. 
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2.2 Inference: Triangular norms (T -norms) Based Calculi 
The inference layer is built on a set of five Triangular norms (T-norms) based calculi. The T-norms' 
associativity and truth functionality entail problem decomposition and relatively inexpensive belief revi­
sion. The theory of T-norms has been covered in previous articles [2,5]. A brief review of their 
definition and their use in RUM is included for the reader's convenience. 
2.2.1 Background Information on T -norms 
Triangular norms (T-norms) and Triangular conorms (T-conorms) are the most general families of 
binary functions that satisfy the requirements of the conjunction and disjunction operators, respectively. 
T-norms and T-conorms are two-place functions from [0,1]x[0,1] to [0,1] that are monotonic, commu­
tative and associative. Their corresponding boundary conditions, i.e., the evaluation of the T -norms 
and T-conorms at the extremes of the [0,1] interval, satisfy the truth tables of the logical AND and OR 
operators. 
In a previous paper [2], six parametrized families ofT-norms and dual T-conorms were discussed and 
analyzed by the author. Of the six parametrized families, one family was selected due to its complete 
coverage of the T-norm space and its numerical stability. This family, originally defined by 
Schweizer & Sklar [ 10], was denoted by Tsc (a ,b ,p ), where p is the parameter that spans the space of 
T-norms. More specifically: 
1 
Tsc(a,b,p) = (a-P + b-p - 1) P 
TSc(a,b,p) = 0 
TSc(a,b,O) = lim Tsc(a,b,p) = ab 
p-+0 
1 
TSc(a,b,p) = (a-P + b-p - 1) P 
if (a-P + b-P) � 1 
if (a-P + b-P) < 1 
Its corresponding T-conorm, denoted by S sc(a,b,p), was defined as: 
Ssc(a,b,p) = 1 -Tsc( l-a ,  1-b , p )  
when p < 0 
when p < 0 
when p -+ 0 
when p > 0 
In the same paper it was shown that the use of term sets determines the granularity with which the 
input certainty is described. This granularity limits the ability to differentiate between two similar cal­
culi; the numerical results obtained by using two calculi whose underlying T -norms are very close in 
the T -norm space will fall within the same granule in a given term set. Therefore, only a finite, small 
subset of the infinite number of calculi that can be generated from the parametrized T -norm family pro­
duces notably different results. The number of calculi to be considered is a function of the uncertainty 
granularity. 
This result was confirmed by an experiment [2] where eleven different calculi of uncertainty, 
represented by their corresponding T -norms, were analyzed. To generate the eleven T -norms, the 
parameter p in Schweizer's family was given the following values: 
-1, -0.8, -0.5, -0.3, 0 (in the limit), 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 8, and oo (in the limit). 
The experiment showed that five equivalence classes were needed to represent (or reasonably approxi­
mate) any T-norm, when term sets with at most thirteen elements were used. The corresponding five 
uncertainty calculi were defined by the common negation operator N(a)= 1-a and the DeMorgan pair 
(Tsc (a ,b ,p ), SSe (a ,b ,p )) for the following values of p: 
p = -1 T1(a,b) = max(O, a+b-1) S1(a,b) = min(1, a+b) 
p = -0.5 Tsc(a,b,-0.5) = max(O, a0·5+b0·5-1)2 Ssc(a,b,-0.5) = 1- max(0,[(1-al·5+(1-b)0·5-1])2 
p -+ 0 T2(a,b) = ab S2(a,b) =a + b - ab 
p = 1 Tsc(a,b,1) = max(O, a-1+b-1-1)-1 Ssc(a,b,1) = 1- max(0,[(1-a)-1+(1-br1-1])-1 
p -+ oo T3(a,b) = min(a, b) S3(a,b) = max(a, b) 
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RUM's inference layer provides the user with a selection of the five T-nonn based calculi described 
above. They are referred to as T 1, T 1.5, T 2, T 2.5• T 3, respectively. 
2.2.2 Operations in a T -norm Based Calculus 
For each calculus, four operations are defined in RUM's Rule System: premise evaluation, conclusion 
detachment, conclusion aggregation, and source consensus. Each operation in a calculus can be com­
pletely defined by a Triangular nonn T(.,.), and a negation operator N(.), just as in classical logic any 
boolean expression can be rewritten in tenns of an intersection and complementation operator. A for­
mal justifications for the following definitions can be found in Reference 4. The four operations are 
defined as follows: 
Premise evaluation: The premise evaluation operation detennines the degree to which all the clauses in 
the rule premise have been satisfied by the matching wffs. Let b; and B; indicate the lower and upper 
bounds of the certainty of condition i in the premise of a given rule. Then the premise certainty range 
[b,B] is defined as: 
Conclusion Detachment: The conclusion detachment operation indicates the certainty with which the 
conclusion can be asserted, given the strength and appropriateness of the rule. Let s and n be the 
lower bounds of the degree of sufficiency and necessity, respectively, of the given rule, and let [b,B] be 
the computed premise certainty range. Then the range [c,C], indicating the lower and upper bound for 
the certainty of the conclusion inferred by such rule, is defined as: 
[c,C] = [ T(s , b) , N( T(n , N(B))) ] 
The degrees of sufficiency and necessity respectively indicate the amount of certainty with which the 
rule premise implies its conclusion and viceversa. The sufficiency degree is used with modus ponens 
to provide a lower bound of the conclusion. The necessity degree is used with modus tollens to obtain 
a lower bound for the complement of the conclusion (which can be transfonned into an upper bound 
for the conclusion itself ). 
Conclusion aggregation: The conclusion aggregation operation detennines the consolidated degree to 
which the conclusion is believed if supported by more than one path in the rule deduction graph, i.e. 
by more than one rule instance. It is also possible to have various groups of deductive paths, i.e. vari­
ous sets of rule instances, all supporting the same conclusion. Each group of deductive paths can have 
a distinct conclusion aggregation operator associated with it. Let the ranges [cj ,Cj ] indicate the cer­
tainty lower and upper bounds of the same conclusion inferred by various rules instances belonging to 
the same group. Then, for each group of deductive paths, the range [d,D] of the aggregated conclusion 
is defined as: 
[d, D] = [ N( T(N(ct) , N(cz) , .. . , N(cm)) , T(N(Ct) , N(Cz) , ... , N(Cm))) ] 
RUM distinguishes between rule instances generated from the same rule and rule instances derived 
from different rules. The first type or rule instances is aggregated first, to take into account the usually 
large amount of redundancy that such rule instances entail. The second set of rule instances is subse­
quently aggregated taking into account the knowledge about the presence or lack of positive/negative 
correlation that characterizes the various rules. 
Source Consensus: The source consensus operation reflects the fusion of the certainty measures of the 
same evidence A provided by different sources. The evidence can be an observed fact, or a deduced 
fact. In the fonner case, the fusion occurs before the evidence is used as an input in the deduction 
process. In the latter case, the fusion occurs after the evidence has been aggregated by each group of 
deductive paths. The source consensus operation reduces the ignorance about the certainty of A, by 
producing an interval that is always smaller or equal to the smallest interval provided by any of the 
infonnation source. If there is an inconsistency among some of the sources, the resulting certainty 
intervals will be disjoint, thus introducing a conflict in the aggregated result Let [L1(A), U1(A )], 
[L2(A), U2(A )], ... , [Ln(A ), Un(A )] be the certainty lower and upper bounds of the same conclusion 
provided by different sources of infonnation. Then, the result [L1ot (A), U101 (A ) ] , obtained from fusing 
all the assertions about A, is given by taking the intersection of the certainty intervals: 
[L,0,(A), U101(A)] = [Max; Li(A), Mini U;(A)] 
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2.3 Control: Calculus selection, Uncertain-Belief Revision, Context Mechanism 
2.3.1 Calculi Selection 
As it was discussed in the previous section, RUM's Ru1e System uses a set of five T-nonn based cal­
cu1i. The calcu1us used by each rule instance is inherited from its rule subclass (the rule before the 
instantiation). The calcu1us can be modified through KEE's user interface or programmatically (i.e. by 
an active value). Class inheritance can also be used to modify the degree of sufficiency and necessity 
of all the rule members of the same class. 
The calcu1i selection consists of two assignments. The first assignment indicates the T -nonn with 
which the premise evaluation and the conclusion detachment will be computed. Such an assignment is 
made for each ru1e, and, through inheritance, is passed to all rule instances derived from the same rule. 
The second assignment indicates the T-cononn (represented by its dual T-nonn) with which the con­
clusion aggregation will be computed. This assignment is made for each subset of rule instances gen­
erated from different rules and asserting the same conclusion. 
2.3.1.1 Rationale for Calculi Selection 
The T-nonn characteristics will detennine the selection choices. For the first assignment, the T-norm 
assigned to each rule for the premise evaluation and the conclusion detachment will be a function of 
the decision maker's attitude toward risk. The ordering of the T-nonns, which is identical to the ord­
ering of parameter p in the Schweizer & Sklar family of T-nonns, reflects the ordering from a conser­
vative attitude (p=-1 or T 1) to a non-conservative one (p � oo or T 3). From the definition of the cal­
cu1i operations, we can see that T 1 will generate the smallest premise evaluation and the weakest con­
clusion detachment (i.e., the widest uncertainty interval attached to the ru1e's conclusion). T-nonns 
generated by larger values of p will exhibit less drastic behaviors and will produce nested intervals 
with their detachment operations. T 3 will generate the largest premise evaluation and the strongest 
conclusion detachment (the smallest certainty interval). 
For the second assignment, the T-nonn assigned to the subsets of rule instances (derived from different 
rules and asserting the same conclusion) will be a function of the lack or presence of positive/negative 
correlation among the rules in each subset. The ordering of the T -nonns reflects the transition from 
the case of extreme negative correlation, i.e., mutual exclusiveness (T 1), through the case of uncorrela­
tion (T 2), to the case of extreme positive correlation, i.e., subsumption (T 3). 
Currently, all calcu1i assignments are explicitly made and modified through the user interface, to exer­
cise the implemented accessing functions. In the next development phase of RUM control layer, the 
calculi assignments will be made by a set of selection rules expressing the meta-knowledge about the 
context. These rules will select the T-nonns that better reflect the knowledge engineer's desired atti­
tude toward risk and the perceived amount of correlation among the rules used in such a context. 
2.3.2 Uncertain-Belief Revision 
A daemon-based implementation of the belief revision of the uncertain infonnation is available in the 
control layer of RUM's Rule System. For any conclusion made by a rule, the belief revision mechan­
ism monitors the changes in the certainty measures of the wffs that constitute the conclusion's support 
or the changes in the calculus used to compute the conclusion certainty measure. Validity flags are 
inexpensively propagated through the rule deduction graph. Five types of flag values are used: 
Good Guarantees the validity of the cached certainty measure detached by the rule instance 
and aggregated into the associated wff. 
Bad (level i) Indicates that the cached certainty measure detached by the rule instance is no longer 
reliable, since the support of some of the wff's in the premise of this rule instance has 
changed. The ith level indicates the correct order of recomputation. 
Inconsistent Indicates that the cached certainty measure associated with the wff is conflicting. The 
inconsistency can be removed by executing a locally defined procedure (differential 
diagnosis type of experiment, recency of infonnation, split in possible words with 
subsets of the original sources, etc.) 
Not Applicable Indicates that the context of the rule instance is no longer active and the rule instance 
contribution to the aggregated certainty measure of the wff should be ignored. 
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Ignorant Indicates that the cached certainty measure detached by the rule instance is too vague 
to be useful. The default behavior is to ignore the rule instance contribution to the 
aggregated certainty measure of the wff. Locally defined procedure could be used to 
remove the ignorance if so specified. 
2.3.2.1 An Example of Using the Uncertain-Belief Revision 
To provide the reader with a better understanding of the uncertain-belief revision, we will make the 
following graphical analogy: the wffs of the reasoning system correspond to nodes in an acyclic deduc­
tive graph; the inference rules in the system correspond to the inference gates that connect the nodes in 
the graph. There are two types of wffs: the observations or assumptions, corresponding to the nodes at 
the frontier of the graph, and the inferred conclusions, corresponding to the intermediate nodes in the 
graph. The first type of node does not have any logical support (its evidence source is the observer or 
the assumption's maker). The second type of node has a logical support represented by the set of rule 
instances that made that inference. For this second type, the logical support is the evidence source. 
Figure 3 illustrates a a portion of an acyclic deductive graph, in which rule instances are depicted as 
gates. In the graph we can observe the following five rules: 
Rl :  C-+ 
R2: c-+ 
R3 
R4: H-+ 
R5 
(A,B � J) 
(D � J) 
(E � J) 
(E,F,G � J) 
(J,I � K) 
suffic. = s1  
suffic. = s2 
suffic. = s3 
suffic. = s4 
suffic. = s5 
necess. = n1 
necess. = n2 
necess. = n3 
necess. = n4 
necess. = n5 
calcul. = T2 
calcul. = T 
calcul. = � 
calcul. = T 
calcul. = �. 
Two more rules, R6 and R7, are partially shown in the same figure. 
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Figure 3: Portion of an Acyclic Deductive Graph 
aggreg. = s2 
aggreg. = s2 
aggreg. = s3 aggreg. = s3 aggreg. = s2 
In Figure 3, C and H (depicted as control lines on the side of a gate) represent two context descrip­
tions that enable/disable the activation of rules Rl ,  R2, R4. The other two rules (R3 and R5) are 
always potentially active (regardless of context). The figure shows the case in which fact D has just 
changed. This change causes the propagation of a bad-validity flag that affects the conclusion of rules 
R2 and RS (J and K, respectively). The numbers attached to the bad flag indicate the order in which a 
recomputation of the certainty measures must be performed. Fact H has also changed and its new 
value no longer satisfies the context description of rule R4, thus causing the not-applicable flag to be 
attached to the detachment of R4. Fact L has also changed, affecting the validity of Rule R6's detach­
ment. 
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2.3.2.2 Reasoning under Pressure 
The belief revision system offers both backward and forward processing. Running in depth-first, back­
ward mode, RUM recomputes the certainty measures of the modified v.ffs that are required to answer a 
given query. This mode (called reasoning under pressure) is used when the system or the user decide 
that they are dealing with time-critical tasks. In the case illustrated in the previous figure, if the value 
of wff K were requested, the systems would perform the following sequence of tasks: fetch the new 
certainty values of D (lower and upper bounds); recompute the detachment of rule R2; use T-conorm 
S2 to evaluate the OR node (with Rl and R2's detachments); ignore R4's detachment, treating R3's 
detachment as the only input to the OR node associated with T-conorm S3; fuse the two OR nodes, 
defining the new certainty values of wff J; recompute the detachment of rule R5; use T-conorm S2 to 
evaluate the OR node (with R5 and R7's detachments), defining the new certainty values of wff K. 
When time is not critical, the system can use a breadth-first, forward mode processing to recompute 
the certainty measures of the modified wffs, attempting to restore the integrity of the rule deduction 
graph. In the case illustrated in the previous figure, this implies an update of fact L and rule R6 (both 
of which were not considered by the backward mode, since they did not play any role in determining 
the value of the proposed query, e.g. wff K). 
The structure of the graph can also change, as new rule instances are created or deleted, due to 
changes in the facts' values, (as opposite to facts' certainty values). The deduction graph is updated 
and bad flags are propagated throughout the network 
2.3.3 Rule Firing Control via Context Activation 
A user-definable threshold can be attached to each rule context, either by local definition or by inheri­
tance from a rule class. A rule context is defined as a conjunction of conditions that must be satisfied 
before the rule can be considered for premise evaluation. Each condition is described by a predicate 
on object-level wjfs (facts in problem domain), or control-level wjfs (markers asserted by meta-rules). 
The semantics of a context C attached to an inference rule (establishing the weak logical equivalence 
between A and B) is given by the following expression: 
C � ( A +-+s .n B ) 
where s and n indicate the lower bounds of the degree of sufficiency and necessity that the rule pro­
vides; � represents the strong material implication; +-+ denotes the weak logical equivalence. 
The context mechanism provides the following features: 
1. By activating/deactivating subsets of the KB, it limits the number of rules that will be considered 
relevant at any given time, thus increasing the overall system efficiency. 
2. By only considering the rules relevant to a given situation, it allows the knowledge engineer to 
effectively use the necessary conditions in the rule's premise. It is now possible to distinguish 
between the failure of a necessary test (described in the premise) and the failure of the rule's 
applicability (traditionally described by other clauses in the same premise and now explicitly 
represented in the context). 
3. By using predicates on the control-level wjfs, it provides the required programmability for defining 
flexible control strategies, such as causing sequences of rules to be executed, firing default rules, 
ordering and handling time-dependent information, etc. 
4. By using hierarchical contexts, it can be used as an organizing principle for the knowledge 
acquisition task. 
3. THE OBJECT BASED SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT 
The second block of the MS/MT architecture is the simulation environment. This environment is cen­
tered around LOTI A, an object-oriented symbolic battle management simulator that maintains time­
varying situations in a multi-player antagonistic game [4]. The development environment based on 
LOTI A constitutes a testbed for validating new techniques in reasoning with uncertainty and for per­
forming information fusion functions [11]. The development environment is composed of four basic 
modules: the window manager, the annotation system, the symbolic simulator (LOTTA), and the Inter­
face (KEEI.A) . The simulation environment was used to program the naval scenario in which the 
information fusion and situation assessment tasks were performed. 
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3.1 The Information Fusion/Situation Assessment Problem 
The Information Fusion (IF)/Situation Assessment (SA) requires a variety of tasks in which uncertainty 
pervades both the input data and the knowledge bases. Beside its intrinsic uncertainty, usually the 
information dealt in each task is also incomplete, time-varying, and, sometimes, erroneous. Thus, the 
SA problem represents a strong challenge for most automated reasoning systems, since it requires an 
integration of the uncertainty management with a truth maintenance system (belief revision system) to 
maintain the integrity of the inference base (or of its relevant subset). The SA problem also requires 
the reasoning system to detect useless and contradicting infonnation, rejecting the fonner and resolving 
the latter. 
There is no uniformly agreed definition of what a situation assessment problem entails. The following 
definitions have been compiled and summarized from a variety of sources [5,8] to succinctly describe 
the SA problem. Given a platform (aircraft, ship, tank) in a potentially hostile environment, the pro­
cess of performing Situation Assessment consists of the following tasks: 
1. Sensor data must be collected from various sources and described as reports. 
2. Time-stamped sensor reports must be consolidated into tracks (each track is the trace of an object 
followed by a given sensor). 
3. Tracks associated to the same object must be fused into a platform. 
4. The detected platform must be classified and identified (by class and type). 
5. Node organization (formation of the identified platforms), use of special equipment, and 
maneuvering must be recognized. 
6. Using the knowledge of the opponent's doctrines and rules of engagement, the recognized forma­
tion and observed use of special equipment must be explained by a probable intent, which is then 
translated into a threat assessment (retrospective SA). 
7. This analysis is then projected into the future to evaluate plausible plans and to determine likely 
interesting developments of the current situation (prospective SA). 
The first four tasks constitute what is generally known as Information Fusion and define the scope of 
the first MS/MT experiment. 
3.2 Example of RUM rules 
The RUM knowledge base (KB) used in MS/MT application is composed of approximately forty rules, 
each of which can be instantiated by new sensor reports, new tracks, or new platforms. A representa­
tive sample of such a KB is provided by the following two rules. 
English Version of Rule-500 (identifying submarines): 
Assuming that a radar was used to generate a sensor report (that with other reports generated by the 
same sensor has been attached to a track associated with a platform), if the first time that the platform 
was detected (in the track's first report), the platform was located at a distance of at most twenty miles 
from our radar (i.e., it was a close-distance radar pop-up) then it is most likely that the platform is a 
submarine. Otherwise, there is a small chance that it is not a submarine. 
RUM's Version of the same rule: 
(add-template 'sub.pos.id-close.pop.up-500 ; Name 
'msmt ; KB 
'((u-lessp (get.uncertain.value (get.value ?track 'first.report) 'range) 
(fuzz 20))) ; Premise-list 
'(((get.value ?track 'platform) class.name submarine s2.rules)) ; Consequence-list 
'((?track first.report)) ; List of wffs in premise 
'(?track) ; List of units in premise 
'((is-in-class? (get.value ?report 'track) 'source '(radar Iotta))) ; Context 
'(most.likely small.chance) ; Sufficiency and necessity 
't3 ; Aggregation T -norm 
'(submarine track.templates)) ; Rule class & instantiation tempi. 
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English Version of Rule-550 (identifying submarines): 
Assuming that a sonar was used to generate a sensor report (that with other reports generated by the 
same sensor has been attached to a track associated with a platform), if the detected platform has a 
low noise emission, and is located at a depth of at least twenty meters, then it is extremely likely that it 
is a submarine. Otherwise, it may not be a submarine. 
RUM's Version of the same rule: 
(add-template 'sub.pos.id-sonar-550 
'msmt 
'((is-value? ?report 'noise-emissions 'low) 
(u-lessp (get.uncertain.value ?report 'elevation) (fuzz -20))) 
'(((get.platfonn ?report) class.name submarine s2.rules)) 
'((?report elevation)) 
'(?report) 
'((is-in-class? (get.value ?report 'track) 'source '(sonar Iotta))) 
'(extremely.likely it.may) 
't3 
'(submarine report.templates)) 
3.2.1 Notes on the Calculi Selection for Rule 500 and 550 
;Name 
; KB  
; Premise-list 
; Consequence-list 
; List of wffs in premise 
; List of units in premise 
; Context 
; Sufficiency and necessity 
; Aggregation T -nonn 
; Rule class & instantiation tempi. 
The T -nonn used to detach the conclusion of rule 500 and 550 is T 3. This is due to the fact that we 
want to obtain the smallest certainty inteiVal associated with the detached conclusion. The T -cononn 
used to aggregate the certainties of the detachments of both rules is S 2• This assignment indicates a 
lack of correlation among the two rules, which is substantiated by the fact that independent sources of 
infonnation (radar and sonar) are used in the context of the two rules. 
4. THE EXPERIMENT 
In the experiment, a modified version of the naval situation assessment scenario used by NOSC to test 
STAMMER and STAMMER2 [1,7,9] was created. In this modified scenario, a missile cruiser of the 
type CGN36 operating with a surface radar (SPS 10) and a passive sensor (GPS-3) faced two plat­
fonns (selected from a set of possible platfonn classes such as cruisers, destroyers, frigates, patrol 
hydrofoils, submarines, merchant ships, and fishing boats). One of the two platfonns was using an 
active sensor (navigational radar), while the second platfonn was not using any sensor. 
Figure 4: Subgraph of the MSMT Knowledge Base 
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The cruiser's task was to track, correlate, and classify each detected object. Both passive and active 
sensors on the cruiser were run twice, generating sensor reports which were translated through the 
KEELA interface into observed wjfs. The sensor report infonnation generated by the passive sensor 
(GPS-3) contained the heading, position, range, speed, and time at which the platfonn was detected. 
This infonnation was attached to a track (fRACK-0) which maintained subsequent sensor reports gen­
erated by the same sensor and associated with the same platfonn (PLATFORM-439). Another track 
(fRACK-3) was generated by using a second sensor (SPS-10). The infonnation from both tracks was 
attached to the same platfonn. Another track (fRACK-7), generated by the cruiser's active sensor, 
was attached to the second platfonn. Figure 4 illustrates a portion of the knowledge base where the 
report, track, and platfonn infonnation is stored. In the same figure it is possible to observe the rule 
instantiation (by track) of the two rules (500 and 550) described in section 3.2. 
The query posed to RUM was to deduce the class value of the first platfonn from the tracks informa­
tion. Using the RUM knowledge base and the backward chaining mode, various attributes of the plat­
fonn were inferred or observed. The platfonn was correctly identified as a merchant ship. This con­
clusion was based on the fact that the platform was reasonably close to a shipping lane, it was travel­
ing at a a typical merchant's speed (in the 9-14 miles/hour range), it was not maneuvering, nor was it 
trying to dodge the cruise's surface radar. Figure 2 (used as an example in section 2.1.1 to describe an 
uncertainty unit attached to a wjJ) shows the uncertainty infonnation and meta-infonnation associated 
with the value assignments to the variable [Platform-439 Class-name]. In the slot VALUES, we can 
see the platform classes which were considered by the system and their corresponding certainty 
bounds: Merchant [.69 1], Submarine [0 .2], Fishing Boat [0 .02] 
The best value in tenns of its certainty is clearly the one which identifies Platfonn-439 as a Merchant. 
Its certainty's lower bound indicates a reasonably large amount of positive (confinning) evidence. Its 
upper bound indicates the absence of any negative (refuting) evidence. The class Submarine obtained 
no confinning evidence and a large amount of negative evidence. The refuting evidence was provided 
by rule 500, which from the failure to observe a close-distance radar pop-up detennined that there was 
only a small chance for the platfonn to be a submarine. The class Fishing Boat also had no 
confinning evidence and an overwhelming amount of negative evidence. This refuting evidence was 
due to the fact that the platfonn was too far from the fishing areas, too big, and was using a radar 
(rules 340, 320, and 330). This information can be obtained from Figure 2, by observing the logical 
support for each of the three values considered for the wff [Platform-439 Class-name], and from Figure 
5, by observing the dominant rules for each value. Each rule instance, fired to infer a value of the wjJ, 
has a cached certainty value (lower and upper bounds) and an associated validity flag. Thus, Figure 5 
provides the infonnation which was schematically described by the acyclic graph depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 5: Relevant Rule Instances in [Platform-439 Class.name] Logical Support 
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S. REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS 
RUM's layered architecture properly addresses the requirements imposed by the SA problem. The 
representation layer captures the uncertain information about the wjJs (lower and upper bounds) used 
by the calculi in the inference layer to determine the uncertainty of the conclusions. The representation 
layer also captures the uncertain meta-information (evidence source or logical support, measures of 
ignorance and conflict) used by the belief revision system and other mechanisms in the control layer. 
The inference layer provides the knowledge engineer with a rich selection of well-understood calculi to 
properly represent existing correlations among rules. Numerical computations performed in this layer 
are efficiently implemented by using a four parameter representation for the uncertainty bounds, sup­
ported by a set of closed form formulae that implement the truth functional uncertainty calculi [2]. 
The control layer provides the explicit selection and modification of uncertainty calculi. Its context 
activation mechanism allows the reasoning system to focus on the relevant subsets of the changing 
inference base (the acyclic deductive graph). The uncertain-belief revision maintains the integrity of 
those relevant subsets, reflecting the changes of the information. RUM's development environment 
provides the traceability of wjJs and rules that is required for proper KB development and refinment. 
The MS/MT experiment described in this paper has been used to illustrate RUM's capabilities in an 
IF/SA application. It is a complete experiment, but certainly not a complex one. A more strenuous 
and realistic validation of RUM is in progress: currently RUM is successfully being used as the rea­
soning system of the Situation Assessment module in DARPA's Pilot's Associate Program [1 1 ] .  In 
this application, the six tasks (described in section 4) that comprise the retrospective SA problem are 
addressed by RUM in Scenarios involving up to twenty platforms. This application is also used to 
derive some of the real-time requirements that will represent the focus of RUM's future development. 
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